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INTRODUCTION
Thomas L. Shaffer*
This symposium abounds with learning and insight, but one
should not overlook the fact that its purposes and its effect are revolution. Institutional confinement of the "mentally ill" in America
is a massive social failure and a festering evil. These authorslawyers, social scientists, scholars, psychiatrists, and studentshave a target in their sights, and they are not out primarily to
analyze the target; they are out to destroy it.'
The organization here is forthright and consistent with its
benevolent tractarian objective. In the first and shorter part, on
the "medicar' decision to institutionalize, Professor Rosenhan,
Mr. Roth, Mr. Dayley and Ms. Lerner assert a familiar thesisthat the commitment decision is a process of social definition, of
rejection, by society, of deviance from norms of behavior; there
is nothing honestly scientific, let alone medical, about it. Mr.
Ferleger, a professional counsel for mental patients, concludes this
section by examining the impact of the medical decision within
the institutional environment and the concomitant threat to the
civil liberties of mental patients.
The second and larger half of the symposium is addressed to
legal rights. Professor Friedman and Dr. Daly relate the confinement of deviants to traditional constitutional principles of interest balancing; Dean Morris and Dr. Luby compare raw official
data on commitment with social and economic variables which
document the logical (but neglected) insight that mental-deviance
processes are used to contain other forms of deviance; Dean
Alexander and Dr. Szasz document a sharp distinction between
penal (or as they call it, institutional) psychiatry and the contracted-for ministry of psychotherapy (only the former, needless
to say, is under attack here). This legal section is completed by
Ms. Tanenbaum's analysis of criminal sexual psychopath devices,
which are used against sexual deviants with a familiar medical
*

Dean, Notre Dame Law School.

1. I have been invited to this present task because of a talk I gave to the

American Hospital Congress in August, 1972, predicting such an attack. The
National Observer, Dec. 9, 1972, at 26. That talk was interpreted, almost universally, as a piece of revolutionary fervor rather than, as I intended, a cool
lawyer's prediction of what psychiatry could expect from law-reform lawyers.
So polar are the times that one cannot even manage an insincerely friendly

warning.
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excuse, and Ms. Kennedy Pollack's analysis of Jackson v. Indiana,
a recent Supreme Court decision which complicates a state's ability
to use the competence-to-stand-trial rubric rather than create
adequate procedures for trial of the mentally ill.
One way to analyze all of this is in terms of the objectives of
the revolution, rather than in medical categories.
The universal, and most pressing, objective of the movement
is to eliminate torture, mutilation, and homicide in institutions.
Dean Morris and Dr. Luby, on admittedly thin data, are encouraging on institutional progress in this respect, but Mr. Ferleger,
2
whose perspective is perhaps better, and other recent indicators,
are not encouraging at all. Mental hospitals are malign, global
places. Mental patients are still beaten, shocked, drugged, or
mutilated into submission. Even where these abuses are controlled,
as they are probably controlled today in many places (the hospital in which Mr. Ferleger researched, for instance, or the hospitals Dean Morris and Dr. Luby looked at), the environment
and the haze of drug-induced docility appear to create and confirm
illness and deviance rather than "cure" it. Under Thorazine, "the
patient . . . remains generally unconcerned, unquestioning and
much easier to manage"-he exhibits, in other words, all of the
classical benefits of lobotomy.
Mr. Ferleger's clients and subjects, if not mutilated, are nonetheless bored, rejected, depersonalized, unheard, sexless, and ultimately either isolated or brought to docile conformity. They are
not seen by anyone in the external, "sane" society as significant,
interesting, or even humanly hurt and needful. To be in a mental
hospital, as Professor Friedman and Dr. Daly demonstrate, is to
be a non-person. Mental patients are, as a matter of law, less
than human.
The second objective of the revolution is to obtain for people
in institutions-and one should include here the retarded 3-the
best care, and the promptest care, available. It is hard to avoid,
2. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 334 F. Supp.
1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), which documented every wild word used in this paragraph of text; see Bergin, The Return
of Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, 118 CoNG. REC., No. 26, E1602-12 (Feb. 24,
1972); B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1972). One cannot account for

these atrocities by finding hospital personnel universally sadistic.

Mr. Ferleger,

Dean Morris and Dr. Luby find sadism to be rare. What seems to be operating
are neglect and the fact that the institutional objective is, always and primarily,

docility. Atrocity could therefore be put on a docility spectrum, ranging from
the surest and least likely method of control (murder) through drug-induced
docility, electro-shock, mutilitation of the brain in lobotomy, beating, seclusion,
and deprivation of "privileges," and on to the subtle forms of behavioral conditioning which Mr. Ferleger describes.
3. See Wyatt v. Stickney, supra note 2.
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from Mr. Ferleger's research, the conclusion that most inmates receive little attention and much abuse, and that those who are
given any ministration at all are given whatever can be devised to
keep them quiet. The honest rubric for this, per Dean Alexander
and Dr. Szasz, is protection from the deviant, for society and for
the family (but not from the family for the deviant), and, as Dean
Morris and Dr. Luby demonstrate, four-fifths of mental patients
are locked up by their families.
Habilitation (or rehabilitation) is at best a promise to condition the "patient" into conformity ("We can't just let them sit by
and be sick"), and at worst a benign, hypocritical excuse for
containment ("problems of agitation are really management problems"). The second objective of the revolution hopes, without
much reason for hope, for the day when courts will allow, as Ms.
Kennedy Pollack prescribes, only that involuntary treatment which
is truly temporary and demonstrably effective.
Both of these first two goals imply a fundamental replacement of authority in the system. No one seems as willing to say
it as Dr. Szasz has been, but the political implication of our
awareness of the mental institution mess is that the medical profession has failed to discharge its stewardship. ("I've found," one
of Mr. Ferleger's psychiatrists says, "that most transfers [to maximum security] are for one reason-the medication is too low.")
Above all else, control of institutions and of the processes for
entering and leaving them, has to be taken away from the doctors.
Confinement of the "mentally ill" is one of the rare instancesand, with a million citizens confined in mental institutions, the most
flagrant-in which persons can be forced to undergo medical
treatment.
There never was any reasonable hope that doctors could, for
instance, predict violent behavior better that the rest of us can;
it should not be surprising (as Mr. Roth, Mr. Dayley and Ms.
Lerner and Professor Friedman and Dr. Daly note), that in fact
they are worse at it. The right-to-treatment rubric, Professor
Friedman and Dr. Daly argue, begs the question. The right to
refuse treatment is, perhaps, the issue. As matters stand: "The
law presumes that the person who is partially incapacitated is
best assisted by depriving him of all liberty."
The third objective of the movement-the ultimate objective,
really-is to abolish institutional psychiatry (and, I think, involuntary clinical and behaviorist psychology) altogether. One
either opens the doors of the institution or erects such imposing
legal protections against involuntary commitment as to make it
impossible to lock the doors. Institutional psychiatry is part of a
broad, old, but ever new movement to solve problems by eliminating
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people who create or carry problems; the "mentally ill," like the aged
ill, the retarded, and the unborn, are social nuisances-which tells
you nothing about them, but everything about the rest of us. 4 Ms.
Tanenbaum's discussion of the appeals of grade "B" criminal sexual
psychopaths in California symbolizes the anomaly of it all; these
people are, with unusual candor, certified by psychiatry to be (a)
sick, (b) untreatable, (c) not necessarily guilty of crime, but (d)
deserving of confinement.
One happy feature of these papers as tracts in the revolution is
that they are realistic about the fact that the mental-health process
is sociological, not medical. Mr. Roth, Mr. Dayley, and Ms.
Lerner argue, and Dean Morris and Dr. Luby demonstrate, that
the poor, the black, women, and the unrepresented are at least
twice as likely to be involuntarily committed as the rest of us.
The issue of bizarre people has become heavily medical only because psychiatry has allowed itself to be converted from the appealing image of Freud bidding Dora good-bye (because she
wanted to go and he, a mere doctor, did not even want to stop her) ,r
to the keepers of jails and houses of torture, retribution, and silly
experimentation. Or, to vary the apocalyptic metaphor, the process of labelling and excluding deviants has become medical because it is comforting for us to find the unacceptable sick rather
than bad. We have lost the rigor of our Puritan tradition, but not
its fearful insecurity.
Psychiatry (see Mr. Roth, Mr. Dayley, and Ms. Lerner)
appears to be massively frustrated at the poor results of shock,
chemistry, "rage reduction," "aversive therapy" and confinement, although it seems usually to want to keep on trying. It is
finally, though, too easy to blame all of this on the doctors. (One
reason we keep doing it I think is that so many of the doctors are
incredibly defensive and unscientific in their reaction to law-reform
lawyers and renegade psychiatrists.)
In the last analysis we
revolutionaries had best realize, as we begin, that America has
mental hospitals because it wants them. The evil is not really
hidden. It has for a long time not been hidden. Our fellow citizens know what they are doing. The danger is our own myopic,
conspiratorial view of public policy.
It is sufficient for a prisoner to identify the holder of the
key to his cell-psychiatry in this case-but the community keeps
the prison and hires psychiatry to guard it. A dismal and partial
theory of medicine oppresses a tenth of America, but it is clear
4. A good theoretical source here is K.
(1966).
5.
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FREUD,

see T. SHAFFER,
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enough that the other nine tenths of us give psychiatry its dubious
license to practice. We are so ungenerous in defining ourselves
that we label as dangerous people who are merely odd. We are
so nervous about our identity that we fear people who don't fit
our ideas of what people-Americans, citizens--ought to be. We
give over our oddballs to the jailers. We console our guilt away
by calling the prisoners "patients" and their jailers "doctors."
As Mr. Roth, Mr. Dayley, and Ms. Lerner demonstrate,
is
not surprising that psychiatrists tend to define social probit
lems in their own professional terms; the surprise-the scandal
-is that we exalt an expectable professionalism into principles of
public policy. The issue, as they demonstrate, is deeper than
"due process of law"; it is illustrated by the way a popular lovelorn
columnist reacts to personal problems which, in a modern liberal's
view, will not respond to conventional admonition. The other
day, for example, Ann Landers referred to a man who took too
few baths as having "a deep-seated and complicated illness." But
she said, "It can be cured."
If psychiatry is replaced, who will bear the issues of deviance
which to date psychiatry has helped us to hide? One possibility,
given the trend in handling other forms of deviance-crime, delinquency, retardation-is a larger responsibility for lawyers.
There are two serious interpersonal-if not ethical-issues
in the lawyer's place as an advocate and a revolutionary in behalf
of mental patients. The first, a mystery, appears in the fact that
other professionals who have labored in this vineyard have grown
calluses. The second, endemic in the emergence of the lawyer as
a champion of the public interest, is an issue of decisionmaking in
the infra-structure. Both issues might benefit from an example,
a tough case.
Lawyers are attracted to what psychiatry calls the paranoid
schizophrenic (and paranoids to lawyers). Suppose the 22-yearold college student next door exhibits the behavior that stimulates
this label. He, John, is convinced that his father wants to kill
him, that the father has prevailed upon John's mother to poison
John's food, that his brothers and sisters talk about him all the
time, and that the neighbors, in league with the police, want to
put him out of the way.
The last delusion comes to be true, of course. John tyrannizes his family, runs down the street in the middle of the night,
takes his clothes off on the sidewalk at noon, accuses virtually
everyone of crime and conspiracy against him, and has even
physically attacked one of his brothers and a teacher at his high
school. These "attacks," if typical, did not hurt either victim,
but they were understandably scary.
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John's parents finally propose to commit him to a mental
institution. One of John's few friends, in his behalf, seeks my
help, and I agree to appear for John, either in a commitment
hearing or on a petition for habeas corpus when he is hospitalized
without court order.
These facts-facts, not clinical guesses-seem clear to me:
1. The behavior in question is threatening to strangers,
terrorizing to John's family, and disturbing to almost anyone.
2. This behavior is obviously wildly out of contact with
reality; it is so clearly out of contact that it impairs John's ability
to do anything expected of him by others-and it, and reactions
to it, have in fact made John miserable.
3. Every generalized source of prediction indicates that
John is probably not dangerous. He is no more likely to kill
himself than anyone else is; he is less likely to kill, or hurt, others
than most of us are. He does, of course, cause massive inconvenience, but much of that can be traced more to our reaction to
John than to John himself. If we could relax-but we can'tJohn wouldn't be so bad.
4. John will not accept voluntarily the ministration of
psychotherapy. The only way to control his conduct is to overpower him, with physical force, imprisonment, or chemicals.
Institutional psychiatry will probably make him worse, but it
may be able to contain him until time, the course of the "disease,"
or the grace of God, make him better.
5. Outright criminal confinement (prison) will containJohn's behavior, but, at best, it will result in the same psychotherapeutic "treatment" available in a hospital and at worst it will
turn John into a "psychopathic" criminal. On the other hand,
John's conduct is probably not egregious enough-yet-to earn
outright imprisonment unless, as is likely, the police and the court
use the criminal process as a means of commitment for "mental
care." As Dean Morris and Dr. Luby predict, a good lawyer can
probably keep John on the outside looking in.
Now, the first issue for me as John's lawyer: If I deal with
him long enough, or with repeated cases of "paranoia" (whether
on the commitment issue or on the issues of treatment in an institution), he or his successors will begin to get under my skin.
People like John-and I have known a few-are hard to get along
with. They are demanding; their delusions-which they love to
pour into the ears of lawyers-are endless and tiresome, even if
the lawyer is facile enough to avoid being afraid of them. As a
legal counselor, one tends to become wary because one fears that
any resistance will destroy rapport. It is everyone's experience
with John that anyone who argues with him ends up an enemy,
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a member, in the argot of social psychiatry, of his paranoid pseudocommunity.
Lawyers can live in that ambiguous interpersonal climate;
we do it all of the time. But survival takes its toll. And there
is no blinding evidence that we lawyers won't end up as neglectful
and hardened as psychiatrists, psychologists, and nurses have
become. I suspect that empathy for John is the emotional fuel
that will keep me working for him; if that is so, this mystery of
the calluses may destroy me as an effective advocate.
The classical answer to the dilemma has been the adversary
ethic.6 I don't have to sympathize with John in order to protect
his interests. The adversary ethic is glib, fatally so in this case.
It is finally glib because I cannot assume here that what John
wants-to stay out-is best for John. Dean Alexander and Dr.
Szasz touch on that dilemma, in the contractual context, but do
not resolve it. If I pursue this dilemma one way I become, as
Dean Morris and Dr. Luby predicted, as condescending and
tyrannical as the institutional psychiatrists have become. (John is
sick and I am, in greasing his way into "treatment," doing what is
best for him and what he, if he were only "himself," would choose
for himself.) If I pursue the dilemma in the other direction I
at best leave John miserable and at worst invite the criminal process,
or self-help from family and neighbors, to do to John what institutional psychiatry proposes to do-to render him docile, to
neutralize him as a nuisance.
The answer to dilemmas of this sort in other legal contextsenvironment, consumerism, representation of the poor, mental retardation-has been the emergence of the "public interest lawyer."
The answer to the mystery of client well-being, and the new subethic, is a broadened concept of professtitute for the adversary
7
sional responsibility:
. . . the individual lawyer . . . not only has to deal with
levels of responsibility as defined and accepted by the profession, he also has to define himself in relation to society and
deal with the questions of what he would like to do and what
he should do. He must resolve or ignore the possible conflict between his view of the lawyer's role and the rewards
which presently reflect the way law in fact is practiced. He
must ask the ultimate question: Am I a professional in the
true sense of the word if I do not accept public responsibilities which I perceive to be part of my role?
The public interest ethic may lead me to decide that John is
6. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON EVALUATION
CANON 5 (1969).
ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

7. F.R. RAYMOND,
4 (1972).
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best off in a mental "hospital." I can then, if still pulled by my
adversary tradition, simply tell John and his friend to seek help
elsewhere. Or I can, on the plausible, defensible theory that John
is incompetent, proceed to "represent" him into the "hospital."
If I make the latter choice, I can console myself by obtaining as
much consent and cooperation from John as is consistent with my
view of his competence, and I can do my best to see that he is
not abused in the "hospital."
The trouble comes from the fact that I cannot avoid becoming a decisionmaker. I am athwart a Sartrean dilemma, and it is
somehow not consoling for me to say that I am merely carrying out
for John what poor John wants. John doesn't even know what he
wants. Or, if he knows, he cannot tell me. In most cases, I
suspect, the railroad will be more visible than it is in John's case,
and the "pathology" less drastic; but once .in a while I am going to
be confronted by the ghost of responsibility, and neither the enfants
terribles of psychiatry nor the benign aspirations of my own profession will deliver me from fearful choice.

PART

I: THE MEDICAL DECISION

In contemporary social usage, the finding of mental illness is made
by establishing a deviance in behavior from certain psychosocial,
ethical, or legal norms. The judgment may be made, as in medicine,
by the patient, the physician (psychiatrist), or others. Remedial
action, finally, tends to be sought in a therapeutic--or covertly
medical-framework. This creates a situation in which it is claimed
that psychosocial, ethical, and legal deviations can be corrected by
medical action. Since medical interventions are designed to remedy
only medical problems, it is logically absurd to expect that they will
help solve problems whose very existence have been defined and
established on non-medical grounds.
-T. SZASZ,
Ideology and Insanity 17 (1970)
If ever it be proven that psychiatry is not reliable, there will be
created a doctrinal abyss into which will sink the whole structure
of commitment law, not just those portions that deal with the harmlessly insane.
-Projects: Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill,
14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 822, 829 (1967)

